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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM HOPKINS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070941-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the probative 
value of having videos played to the jury was not substantially outweighed substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? This issue is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, U 35, 52 P.3d 1194, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 
1123, 123 S.Ct. 859, 154 L.Ed.2d 805 (2003). This issue was preserved in an oral 
motion made during trial (R. 160: 92-). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
William Hopkins appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of three 
counts of Enticing a Minor over the Internet, second degree felonies, and eight counts of 
Attempted Dealing in Harmful Material to a Minor, class A misdemeanors. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
William Hopkins was charged by amended information filed in Fourth District 
Court on June 28, 2007 with the following: Counts 1-2 Enticing a Minor over the 
Internet, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-4-401; Counts 
3-6 Dealing in Harmful Material to a Minor, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-10-1206(1), or in the alternative, Attempted Dealing in Harmful 
Material to a Minor, class A misdemeanors; Count 7 Enticing a Minor over the Internet, a 
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second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-4-401; Counts 8-11 
Dealing in Harmful Material to a Minor, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-1206(1), or in the alternative, Attempted Dealing in Harmful Material 
to a Minor, class A misdemeanors (R. 33-30). On July 26, 2007 he pled "not guilty" to 
the charges (R. 39-38). 
On August 30, 2007 Hopkins filed a motion to dismiss counts 2-6 and 8-11 of the 
amended information (R. 41). The trial court ruled that while Hopkins could not be 
found guilty of Dealing in Harmful Material to a Minor, he could potentially be found 
guilty of Attempted Dealing (R. 110-105). An amended information as to counts 3-6 and 
8-11 was filed, reflecting the trial court's ruling (R. 113-111). 
On September 19, 2007 a jury trial was held with Judge Stott presiding (R. 149-
46). During its deliberation, the jury submitted the following questions: "We would like 
to know if a time space of one hour constitutes two separate events legally." Judge Stott 
replied: "This is a question of fact which the jury must decide, based on all the evidence 
presented." And "Can a detective initiate a conversation without violating laws of 
entrapment [specifically referring to count 7]." The Judge answered: "Entrapment is not 
an issue in this case and should not be considered by you" (R. 140). The jury found 
Hopkins guilty on all counts after deliberating for between 2-3 hours (R. 143-41, 146). 
On November 1, 2007 Hopkins was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 1-15 
years at the Utah State Prison on counts 1, 2 and 7, and concurrent terms of 1 year on 
3 
counts 3-6, 8-11 (R. 158-55). 
Hopkins subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Lance Smith is employed as a detective with the Payson Police Department (R. 
160: 50). He also works with the Utah County Sex Crimes Task Force, working 
enticement and child pornography cases (R. 160: 51). As part of this assignment, he will 
log on into an Internet chat room once a week and "wait for people to come chat with us" 
(R. 160: 53, 54). He is also not allowed to initiate the subjects of sex or meeting (R. 160: 
54). However, once an individual "bring[s] up sexual content or the meeting place, it 
doesn't matter how many times we chat with them afterwards, they've already initiated it, 
so we can—we can bring it up later on a second chat or a third chat...." (R. 160: 54). 
On March 15, 2007 he was in a room chatting under the name of Tiffany girl 105 
and Hopkins, who was logged in as Regulator2002, "asked if I remembered him" (R. 
160: 55).l Smith replied "a little" and Hopkins "went into asking about sex and if I liked 
it" (R. 160: 57). Smith informed Hopkins that he was thirteen years old and they 
continued to chat about sexual matters (R. 160: 57, 61). He was given Hopkins' phone 
number (R. 160: 58, 66). The first conversation lasted approximately 50 minutes, from 
1
 He didn't know Hopkins' real identity at this point (R. 160: 55). He subsequently 
learned Hopkins' name after investigation upon receiving two photographs and phone 
numbers from Regulator2002 (R. 160: 56). 
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8:13 until 9:02 p.m. (R. 160: 57). State's Exhibit #1 is a printed copy of this first chat (R. 
160: 58-59). Smith read the contents of this chat to the jury (R. 160: 60-67). 
The chat references videos that Hopkins sent to him online (R. 160: 61, 63-64). 
Smith testified he received five videos during this first chat which he saved to a disk (R. 
160: 69, 70). He testified that Hopkins was most interested in a video entitled "Lee 
Love" which "is a 19-year-old blond girl with glasses and braces" (R. 160: 69). "The 
video tried to make her look younger than her actual age" through the use of braces and 
pony tails (R. 160: 69). The chat also contains explicit sexual references from Hopkins 
including: "Do you want to have phone sex?" (R. 160: 61); and "I want to f~k u in all 
the places u want me to f—k u" (R. 160: 62). 
They began chatting again that evening at approximately 10 p.m. (R. 160: 58). 
State's Exhibit #2 is a printed copy of this chat (R. 160: 59). Smith testified that he had 
downloaded the videos Hopkins had sent then waited an hour before typing, "You there?" 
(R. 160: 68). They began chatting again and Hopkins asked why "she" didn't call him 
(R. 160: 70-71). Hopkins also says, "I want you to hold onto my cock," and 
Smith/Tiffany girl replied, "The video [Hopkins had sent] showed me how" (R. 160: 71). 
Again Hopkins asked, "You going to call?" (R. 160: 71). 
Smith had Officer Sandoval, a female, call Hopkins in his presence on the phone 
number he'd been given by Hopkins (R. 160: 72). Afterwards, Hopkins asked if 
Tiffany girl was a cop, and the following was said: 
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Smith: No. Why do you say that? 
Hopkins: You sound older. 
Smith: Cold 
(R. 160: 71). Hopkins asks what "she" looks like and asks her for a picture of herself (R. 
160: 73). Smith did not send a picture (R. 160: 74). The chat continued and Smith 
subsequently asked, "[S]o which one of the videos do you want me to do to you first?" 
(R. 160: 75). The conversation then became graphically sexual (R. 160: 75). Hopkins 
becomes insistent about seeing a photo of "her" and the chat ends with the following: 
Smith: Then you will not come see me unless I send you a pic? Why? 
Hopkins: I want to know that you are a real, not some fake. 
Smith: I talked to you and you don't—not believe me. 
Hopkins: Well, this is where it ends then, sorry, you won't want to be real with 
me. 
Smith: What do you mean, real? I called you. 
Hopkins: You're teasing me with the—with what you are saying, sending 
videos. Whatever.... And I send real pic of me for you to see what I look like and you 
won't do the same for me. What year were you bom? You have ten seconds to answer 
or I'm out—out... You're a cop. 
Smith: Okay. Whatever. 
Hopkins: Be honest, you're a cop. 
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Smith: .... If I was a cop, when—then why send me the videos? 
(R. 160: 76-77). Smith saved the chats and the videos and the pictures and began trying 
to discover Hopkins' identity (R. 160: 77). 
On April 12, 2007 Smith was in the chat room and discovered Hopkins chatting 
under another name (Dragonlance84015) to another officer (R. 160: 78). Smith jumped 
online again and contacted him (R. 160: 78). Smith testified that "We—again, we started 
chatting, he started talking sexual and sending videos" (R. 160: 79). Smith was again 
chatting under the name Tiffanygirl (R. 160: 79). Hopkins when contacted here, asked 
for Tiffanygirfs age, sex and location and was told "13, Provo" (R. 160: 81). Hopkins 
then indicated he was horny and wanted to "f—k" (R. 160: 81). He also began sending 
videos to Tiffanygirl and when asked what the videos were, he replied "porno" and "sex" 
(R. 160: 81). Again they began chatting about sexual matters, and Smith subsequently 
asked, "You not care if I am 13? Is that hot?" to which Hopkins replied, "Yes. Hot. 
Hot. Hot" (R. 160: 82). The conversation remained sexual in nature and Hopkins, when 
advised Tiffanygirl had a fourteen year old friend named Angie, asked if she would f—k 
him too, and stated he wants "to f—k you both" (R. 160: 83). The following 
conversation then ensued: 
Hopkins: I want to f—k you both. 
Smith: Cool. When? 
Hopkins: Soon. 
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Smith: 
Hopkins: 
Smith: 
Hopkins: 
Smith: 
Hopkins: 
Smith: 
Hopkins: 
Smith: 
Hopkins: 
Smith: 
Hopkins: 
How soon? 
Weekend. 
Cool. Me and Angie? 
Well, yeah. 
Cool. 
Where? 
Where what? 
Meet you. 
In Provo. I do not drive, laugh out loud. 
You're 13. I know you do not have a car, laugh out loud. 
Are you coming to me? 
Can I come in you? 
(R. 160: 83-84). They chatted about his job in general terms and then chatted briefly 
about the videos Hopkins had sent during this chat (R. 160: 85). Smith testified that these 
videos were different than the ones he received on March 15th and that they showed 
"people having either vaginal sex or oral sex or masturbation and things like that" (R. 
160: 85). 
The jury was shown portions of each video sent to Smith by Hopkins (R. 160: 96). 
Smith, as himself, subsequently contacted Hopkins and eventually met with him. 
During a subsequent conversation about "chatting with a girl named Tiffany," Hopkins 
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told Smith that he "knew she was 13, but it was fantasy" (R. 160: 120). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hopkins asserts that the trial court abused his discretion in playing portions of 
each video to the jury under rule 403, where the probative value of the videos was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, particularly when Hopkins 
was willing to stipulate to the harmfulness of the material on the videos, and where 
Detective Smith was able to provide the jury with alternative proof through testimony as 
to the specific contents of the video. Accordingly, Hopkins requests that this Court 
conclude that the trial court abused his discretion in playing portions of all the videos to 
the jury which requires a reversal of his convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED HIS DISCRETION UNDER RULE 403 IN PLAYING 
PORTIONS OF EACH VIDEO TO THE JURY 
Hopkins was charged with three counts of Enticing a Minor over the Internet, and 
eight counts of Attempted Dealing in Harmful Material to a Minor. At trial the State 
sought to introduce into evidence and play for the jury eight videos which Hopkins had 
sent to Detective Smith, while he was posing as a 13-year old girl on the Internet 
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(Exhibits #4 and 5). Hopkins objected to introduction of the videos under Rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, alleging that it would be highly prejudicial and would incite the jury 
to hostility against the defendant if they were to watch the videos (R. 160: 92). The State 
asserted the videos were part of the enticement Hopkins was engaged in, and that they are 
relevant to the issue of whether Hopkins attempted to deal in material harmful to a minor. 
Therefore, the probative value of the videos outweighed any prejudice. Each of the 
videos depicts nudity and various sexual acts, including vaginal sex, oral sex and 
masturbation (R. 160: 85). Hopkins was willing to stipulate that the content of the videos 
constitutes material harmful to a minor under the statute (R. 160: 94-95). 
The trial court ruled that the jury would be instructed that the content of the videos 
is material harmful to a minor, and that each of the videos would be played for the jury 
for a short time to be determined by the court (R. 160: 96). The trial court stated: CT 
believe that the videos are proper to be seen by reason of the information distributed 
during the time of the chats in question and the control will be made as to the amount of 
time that the videos will be shown (R. 99-106). Hopkins asserts that the court abused its 
discretion in introducing the videos into evidence and in having them played for the jury. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: "Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." In other words, 
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"the trial court has discretion to exclude evidence if the court finds that the probative 
value of the evidence is 'substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission would 
consume unnecessary time, cause undue prejudice, or unfairly surprise a party/ " State v. 
Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 547 
(Utah 1983). In properly exercising its discretion in this determination, a trial court must 
consider a multitude of factors, including "the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility." Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 at f^ 36 (citation omitted). 
In State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525 (Utah App.), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990), this Court ruled that the trial court had not abused its discretion under Rule 403 in 
playing pornographic videos to the jury in a case where the defendant was charged with 
multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, dealing in harmful material to a minor, 
and distributing pornographic material even though the defense was willing to stipulate 
that the videos were pornographic, for the purpose of sexual arousal, and contained 
material that would be harmful to a minor. 788 P.2d at 527. Hopkins asserts that his case 
is distinguishable and mandates a different result. 
In Moore, the defendant had engaged in the production and distribution of 
homemade pornographic videotapes, and had furnished commercial pornographic videos 
to a minor as a means of encouraging her to participate in the making of other homemade 
pornographic videos. 788 P.2d at 526. Moreover, police learned of defendant's activities 
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through an informant and then tape-recorded a conversation between defendant and the 
informant. Id. 
In this case, on the other hand, only relatively short commercial videos were 
utilized by Hopkins. Furthermore, Detective Smith was at all times the recipient of the 
videos. He had a personal knowledge of the content of the videos, and the content of the 
conversations with Hopkins. His ability to testify as to the specific content of the videos 
would have been a viable alternative proof of the nature of the videos, and coupled with 
Hopkins' stipulation, there was no need for the jury to see any of the videos, much less 
portions of all the videos as was allowed by the trial court. The only purpose in playing 
the videos under these circumstances was to unfairly prejudice the defendant because the 
very nature of the content displayed in graphic form on the videos had to rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
In addition, rule 403 requires that courts engage in a balancing between the 
probativeness of potential evidence and its likely prejudicial effect. See, e.g., State v. 
Downs. 2008 UT App 247, ^ 7, 190 P.3d 17. The trial court could have minimized the 
prejudicial effect of the videos, and the degree to which the jury was roused against 
Hopkins, by using the stipulation of the parties combined with playing portions of one or 
two of the videos. However, the trial court failed to engage in such a balancing between 
the probative value of the videos and their prejudicial effect. Hopkins asserts that failure 
to strike such an appropriate balance constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
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Accordingly, Hopkins requests that this Court conclude that the trial court abused 
his discretion in playing portions of all the videos to the jury which requires a reversal of 
his convictions. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Hopkins asks that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the matter to the 
Fourth District Court for a new trial. 
DATED this 26th day of November, 2008. 
MARGARET P. LINDS, 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
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2008. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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